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In its broadest sense, a "standard," the Encyclopaedia Britannica tells us, 
is anything used to measure. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to explicate 
this definition in the context of health and environmental policies. 
It seems useful, and perhaps necessary, to start with a brief review of the 
different ways in which such terms as "norms" and "standards" are used in the 
fields with which we are concerned. For, while most health planners would probably 
agree that "the establishment of norms and standards is one of the most important 
of the methods used in planning the development of the health servicesYu1 these 
terms, like the concept of planning itself, are open to a variety of different 
and often contrasting, interpretations. 
For instance, attempts have been made to distinguish between norms and 
standards. An official WHO document refers to norms as rules or indicators which 
are scientifically determined by research, while standards are supposed to be fixed 
arbitrarily.* A similar distinction is made in health planning in the USSR, 
between "scientifically based" norms, and the so-called design norms and standards, 
developed primarily on the basis of practical experience. Besides being scientif- 
ically based, norms relate more directly to the final outputs of the health system, 
while standards are seen essentially as input variables. Thus, norms refer to 
"scientifically established indices of environmental conditions and of the medical 
care required by the cornunity or by various population groups, as well as of the 
utilization of health facilities." Health standards are "indices relating to the 
resources required to meet the needs specified by the norms, i.e. indices relating 
to the public health facilities and the availability of medical care.lt3 
According to Soviet usage the first category includes: environmental, 
sanitary, and epidemiological norms; norms for ,the requirements of the community 
for medical care; and even "productivity norms," e.g. the work load per hour of 
doctors in various types of medical care. In the second category we find such 
indices as: organizational standards; standards for the average length of stay 
of patients in bed and for the average bed occupancy; construction standards; 
standards for the number of hospital beds, both in the aggregate and for the 
various specializations; staffing standards; and so on. 
G.A. Popov, Principles of Health Planning in the USSR, Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1971, p. 129. 
World Health Organization, Health Planning : Report of the Technical, Discussions 
at the Eighteenth World Health Assembly, Geneva: Document A 181 Technical 
Discussion/ 6 Rev. 1, 1965, p. 11. 
G.A. Popov, op. cit.,p. 130. 
"Norm" and "standard" are here uscd, clearly, in a normative sense, i.e. as rules-- 
usually expressed in quantitative terms--in relation to which a given situation may 
be gauged and judged good or bad. It is, in fact explicitly asserted that "ideally, 
all norms and standards should be optimal in character," and th;? hope is expressed 
that "as the economy of the USSR develops, it will be possible for design norms 
and standards to be revised so as to make them approach the optimum more closely."4 
The main part of this paper is devoted to a critical discussion of the 
assumptions implicit in the above definitions and concepts. Other distinctions 
are also possible, and have been used. Thus, in functional terms it is possible 
to identify three major uses of norms and standards: 
1) as indicators of need, in terms both of inputs and outputs of the 
health system, or of a subsystem, and of particular groups of 
people to whom specific services are directed; 
2) as rules of action or policy constraints5 imposed upon a variety 
of agents, public and private (e.g. environmental and safety 
standards) ; and 
3) as tools of control, to ensure that plans are carried out according 
to prescriptions, and to measure the extent of possible deviations 
between objectives and actual performance. 
Applying other taxonomic criteria (e.g. the method uscd in deriving the 
standards: statistical sampling, expert opinion, laboratory research), still other 
classifications are of course possible, but are not immediately relevant to the 
present discussion. It should, however, be noted that in the western literature 
the term "standard" (which largely replaces "norm") is often used in a much broader 
sense. This is particularly true in the environmental field, where the term may be 
applied to any kind of controlling mechanism on the utilization of environmental 
services, e.g. taxes and subsidies as well as direct controls on emissions or 
quality deterioration. 
2. STANDARDS AS INDICATORS OF NEED FOR HEALTH 
It seems appropriate to begin a critical discussion of concepts and assump- 
tionsemployed in the process of standard setting, with an examination of the use 
of standards as indicators of need. Indeed, in spite of its apparent simplicity, 
"need" is one of the most ambiguous concepts used in planning and policy analysis. 
In the first place, it is not usually clear whether the alleged "needs of society" 
reflect the authoritative decisions of the political authorities, the wishes of a 
majority of the citizens (perhaps revealed by "manifest demand"), the judgments of 
a restricted group of experts and administrators, or the values of an enlightened 
and concerned elite. Also, need can be assessed in (more or less) objective terms 
1) when it refers to some minimal prerequisites of individual or societal survival, 
or 2) when it is expressed as a function of the expectations that are generated by 
a given level of socioeconomic and technological development. In the first case, 
standards usually take the form of lower bounds (minimum levels); in the second, 
minimum levels are often criticized as being too modest and conservative, and 
discussion focuses on the definition of "optimal" standards. 
50n the concept of policy constraint, cf. G .  Elajone, "The Feasibility of Social 
Policies," Policy Sciences, forthcoming. 
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The notion of optimality immediately evokes questions of costs, benefits, 
and constraints. Many discussions of "medical needs" leave tlle impression that 
these are needed regardless of financial and social costs, and of institutional 
and political constraints. One persistent source of confusion is the fact that 
must doctors and public health planners think about needs in total, rather than 
marginal, terms. But it is clear that with given resources and tect:nical possi- 
bilities, higher levels of one standard (expressing a certain degree of satis- 
faction of some social need) inevitably imply lower levels for other standards. 
For instance. high standards of purity for air will entail--except for the 
possibility of recycling waste material--lower levels of quality for water and 
land, since waste cannot be destroyed but only transformed in different ways and 
disposed of through different environmental media. In fact, the stringent 
regulations recently imposed by air pollution control agencies in many cities have 
had the consequence of producing tons of additional solid wastes which could not 
be adequately handled by the sanitation departments. 
To make this point completely clear, suppose an environmelital agency has to 
allocate a given budget between water (W) and air (A) protection. Of course, 
restriction to these two media is dictated only by the desire to use a 2-dimensional 
grap11ic;ll representation (one could interpret the vertical axis as indicating 
"other environmental media"). Also for the sake of simplicity, I shall assume 
that the quality of each of the two media is expressed by a singlc scalar measure, 
say, dissolved oxygen concentration (DO) in the case of 1Jatt.r. Thus, che  sc.ale 
on the W-axis is deEined in terms of DO units (mgfl). With a given budget and 
technical possibilities, the agency can achieve either the quality level O i i  i'.. 
water, or level OA for air, or any combination of conditions for water and air 
shown along the possibility boundary AeW (Figure 1). 
F I G U R E  I .  
Suppcise t h a t  t h e  p r e s c n t  q u a l i t y  l e v e l s  f o r  w a t e r  and a i r  a r e  wl and a  1' 
r c s p e c t i v i . l y ,  b u t  t l i a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r e s s u r e  i s  b e i n g  e x e r t e d  on t h e  agency t o  
r a i s e  t i le q u a l i t y  of t h e  w a t e r  a t  l e a s t  t o  l e v e l  w  . The d i ag ram makes c l e a r  t h a t  
t i l e  " n e ~ d "  f o r  c l e a r e r  w a t e r  can  h e  s a t i s f i e d ,  undgr  t h e  assumed c o n d i t i o n s ,  o n l y  
I,y r e d u c i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  f o r  a i r  ( f rom a 1  ti? a 2 ) .  1n '  o r d e r  t o  weigh t h e  
a d v a n t a g e  o r  p u r e r  w a t e r  a g a i n s t  t h e  ( o p p o r t u n i t y )  c o s t  of  f o r e g o n e  c l e a n e r  a i r ,  
one  would have  now t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  u t i l i t y  i n d i c a t o r  1, whose l e v e l  c u r v e s  r e p r e s e n t  
s l t c r n a t i v c  c o m l i n a t i o l ~ s  of w a t e r  and a i r  q u a l i t y  l e v e l s  t h a t  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  
e q u i v a l e r ~ t  i n  u t i l i t y  t e rms .  The p r e s c r i p t i o n  would t h e n  be  t o  ciioose t h e  combina- 
t i o n  of s t a n d a r d s  i i T r r e s p o ~ ~ d i n g  t o  t h e  p o i n t  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  cu rve - -po in t  e  i n  
F i g u r t .  I - -a t  which t h e  s l o p e  o i  t i le  h i g h e s t  a t t a i n a b l e  i s o - u t i l i t y  l i n e  e q u a l s  t h a t  
o i  tiic AeW c u r v e .  
Hut even  w i t h o u t  i n t r o d u c i n g  a l l  t h e  s u b t l e t i e s  of u t i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  we c a n  
u s e  o u r  s i m p l e  d i a g r a m  t o  g i v e  v i s u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  one  of t h e  most conullon 
e r r o r s  i n  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g ,  n a n ~ ~ e l y  t h r  a t t e m p t  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  I ~ i g h c > s t  p o s s i b l e  
s t a n d a r d  i n  a  c e r t a i n  f i e l d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  medium, 
w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  t o  i t s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t .  i n  o u r  c,xamplc, t h e  
c h o i r c  n i  t h e  i)iJ l e v e l  f o r  t h e  w a t e r  q u a l i t y  s t a n d a r d  would be  a s  d i s a s t r o u s  a s  ;I 
c l ~ o i c e  o i  Or\ f o r  a i r .  
O r  r i w r s t . ,  c x p s r t  h e , l l t h  p1 ;mner s  a r e  q u i t e  awarc  of t h i s  d a n g e r .  A  S o v i e t  
r t  i e :  " A  conmlon f ~ u l t  i n  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  of s t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
I \ ) ? -  ~rc-ciicnl c a r e  i s  t o  s t u d y  t h e  v a r i o u s  fcirms o f  s u c h  c a r e  i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  e . g .  t o  
s t l ~ i l y  i!L!::pital c a r e  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  forms of  
~ u t p a t i e n t  c a r e  a r e  a l s o  a v a i l a b l e .  S t a n d a r d s  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  way a r e  u n s u i t a b l e  
f o r  u s e  i n  Ileal t h  p l ann ing . "h  
Wl~at i s  n o t  s o  c l e a r l y  p e r c e i v e d  i s  t h a t  t h e  f a u l t  i s  t h e  d i r e c t  consequence  
o t  a p p l y i n g  t h a t  "method of  p r i s r i t i e s "  w h i c l ~  t h e  same a u t h o r  h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  
indic .d ted  a s  a  n e c e s s a r y  t o o l  o l  11ea l th  p l a n n i n g .  No h i e r a r c h y  of n e e d s  o r  l i s t  
oC p r i o r i t i e s  c a n  s o l v e  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  p lob l em o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker ;  a n d ,  a s  t h e  
p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  s ~ ~ g g e s t s ,  t i le s e t t i n g  of s t a n d a r d s  i s  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  an  
a l l o i a t i o n  p rob l em.  A11 n e e d s  a r e  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  s ensed  and t h e  p o l i c y  maker 
c a n n o t ,  and shou ld  n o t ,  w a i t  u n t i l  one  need i s  s a t i s f i e d  h e f o r e  b e g i n n i n g  t o  be  
c o i ~ c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  i t e m s  on h i s  l i s t  of p r i o r i t i e s . '  
Plar~v s t a n d a r d s  u sed  i n  I ~ e a l t h  p l a n n i n g ,  e . g .  h o s p i t a l  bed a v a i l a b i l i t y  and 
s t a f f i l l g  : , !?ndards ,  a r e  s u p p o s e d l y  det -ermined on  t h e  b a s i s  of r e v e a l e d  demand ( a s  
m e a s u t e d ,  I ~ L -  i n s t a n c e ,  by number of h o s p i t a l  a d m i s s i u n s  o r  h o s p i t a l  beds  u sed  p e r  
1000 p o p u l a t i o n ,  by i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  w a i t i r , ~  l i s t s ,  e t c . )  The u n d e r l y i n g  assump- 
t i o n  i s  t l i a t  t h e  demand f o r  h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n  i s  exogenous ly  d e t e r m i n e d .  Now, 
p l a n n i n z  methods  based on m a n i f e s t  demand a r e  a n a l y t i c a l l y  a p p e a l i n g  b e c a u s e  t h e y  
c a n  be  d i r e c t l y  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  t e rms  of we l l -deve loped  queu ing  t h e o r y  mode l s .  But 
t h e s e  methods  a r e  open t o  a  b a s i c  o b j e c t i o n :  t h e y  i g n o r e  t h e  e f f e c t  of a v a i l a b l e  
s u p p l y  on  h o s p i t a l  a d m i s s i o n  r a t e s ,  and on t h e  a v e r a g e  d u r a t i o n  of  s t a y  p e r  c a s e .  
T h i s  pilenomenon i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v i d e n t  i n  c o u n t r i e s  whose h e a l t h  s y s t e m s  p r e c l u d e  
t h e  r a t i o n i n g  of  t h e  h e a l t h  r e s o u r c e s  througl l  t h e  p r i c i n g  mechanism, w h i l e  
p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  d o c t o r ' s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  f reedom i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t r e a t m e n t  of e a c h  c a s e .  
'G .A.  P ~ p o v ,  op c l t . ,  pp .  131-132 
71:or a  good d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  a m b i g u i t i e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  method,  and 
of  t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  i n  which it i s  a  v a l i d  c r i t e r i o n  of c h o i c e ,  s e e  C . J .  H i t c h  and 
R . N .  ElcKean, The Economics of De fense  i n  t h e  Nuc lea r  Age, Cambridge: Harvard  
L l n i v c r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1960,  e s p e c i a l l y  pp. 122-123. A l so  A . J .  C u l y e r ,  R . J .  L a v e r s ,  and 
A .  W i l l i ~ m s ,  " S o c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s :  H e a l t h , "  i n  S o c i a l  T r e n d s ,  No. 2 ,  1971,  pp .  31-42 
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- 
The p r e c e d i n g  d i s c u s s i o ~ i  c a n  be  sunmarized by s a y i n g  t h a t  a r a t i o n a l  
app roach  t o  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  a  s t a n d a r d  r e q u i r e s  a n  e s p l i c i t  v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  
rriarginal t r a d e - o f f s  between i t  and o t h e r  i n p u t s  ( i n c l u d i n g  o t h e r  s t a n d a r d s )  
r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  same i n d i c a t o r ,  o r  g roup  of i n d i c a t o r s ,  o f  s t a t e  of h e a l t h .  
Such v a l u a t i o n s  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  s l o p e s  of t i le l e v c l  l i n e s  o f  t l ie i n d i c a t o r  
a s  t h e y  p a s s  t l ~ r o u g h  t h e  I ~ o s s i t ~ i l i t y  boundary  (Aeld i n  F i g u r e  1 )  v e r t i c a l l y  
above  e a c h  p o s s i b l e  l e v e l  of  t h e  s t a n d a r d  unde r  d i s c u s s i o n .  
Tile i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  any s t a n d a r d  whatsoever- -whether  i t  re la t* . :  
t o  h e a l t h ,  t o  t h e  u rban  o r  n a t u r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t o  p r o p e r t y  darnage, o r  t o  
a e s t h e t i c  va lues - - can  a lways  be e x p r e s s e d  a s  ( a  f u n c t i o n  o f )  3 c o s t - b e n e f i t  r a t i n .  
I t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  s e t  s t a n d a r d s  and norms a t  such  l e v e l s  a s  would e l i m i n a t e  
any h a z a r d  t o  I~uman h e a l t h ,  o r  s a t i s f y  any c o n c e i v a b l e  n e e d .  Even i n  t h e  most 
t e c h n i c a l  f i e l d s  r e c o u r s e  t o  human judgment i s  u n n v v i d a b l e ;  r i s k s  must a lways  
be t a k e n ,  needs  have t o  be matched a g a i n s t  r e s o u r c e s  and t e ~ : l ~ n i c a l  and i n s t i i u t i o n -  
a1  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and d i s c o u n t  r a t e s  f o r  f u t u r e  b e n e f i t s  have t o  be  d e c i d e d  upon. 
Thus ,  norms and s t a n d a r d s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  l i f e  necessarily r e p r e s e n t  
a compromise between a s p i r a t i o n s  and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of f e a s i b i l i t y .  I n  t h c  l a s t  
a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  s e t t i n g  of a  s t a n d a r d  i s  a soc ioeconomic  d e c i s i o n ,  a n  i m p l i c i t  
v a l u a t i o n  o f  t i le  u t i l i t y  of  hunan l i f e ,  h e a l t h ,  and we l l -be i1 ig .8  
Two i n ~ p l i r t n n t  consequences  f o l l o w  from a  c o s t - b e n e i - i t  v i ew  of  s t a n d a r d s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between " s c i e n t i f i c "  and  " a r b i t r a r y M 9  s t a r ~ c l a r d s  t? l r l i s  o u t ,  
upon c l o s e r  e x a m i n a t i o n ,  t o  be u n t e n a b l e .  No s t a n d a r d  o r  norm c a n  be e s t n b l i s l l e d  
on  p u r e l y  s c i e n t i f i c  o r  t e c h n i c a l  g rounds  ( even  a s suming  t h a t  a c o n s i s t e n t  body 
of r e l e v a n t  and w e l l - t e s t e d  knowledge i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  which i s  by uo  means ti le 
u s u a l  c a s e  i n  t h e  h e a l t h  and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  f i e l d s ) ,  dny more t h a n  s o c i a l  go , l l s  i ~ d n  
be deduced f rom f a c t u a l  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  no  s t a n d a r d  i s  a c ~ u n l l y  
s e t  i n  a  p u r e l y  a r b i t r a r y  f a s h i o n ,  t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  w i t h o u t  some i m p l i c i t  o r  
e x p l i c i t  e v a l u a t i o n  of b e n e f i t s ,  c o s t s ,  and r i s k s .  
T h i s  b r i n g s  u s  t o  t h e  s econd  p o i n t .  S t a n d a r d s  a r e  s e t  a l l  t h e  t i m e ,  i n  t i le 
most  v . i r i ed  f i e l d s  of human l i f e  and a c t i v i t y .  Each of  them r e p r e s e n t s ,  as  I 11~1vc. 
a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  a  p a r t i c u l a r  v a l u e  of  a  c o s t - b e n e f i t  r a t i o  whose t e r m s ,  i n  t h e  
numera to r  and ti le d e n o m i n a t o r ,  call b e  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  r e a s o n a b l e  P I - c c i s i v n  i n  .lny 
s p e c i f i c  c a s e .  o f '  t h e s e  t e r m s ,  t h o s e  r e l a t i n g  t o  c o s t  c a n  ~ ~ o r l n a l l y  b e  q u a n t i f i e d  
w i t h o u t  t o o  much d i f f i c u l t y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  may be sorne u n c e r t a i n t y  c o n c e r n i ~ n g  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  f o r  c a p i t a l .  Hence, g i v e n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  v a l u e  s o  t l i a t  
ha s  been chosen  by t h e  r e s p o n s i b l e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  we ca l l ,  i l l  p r i n c i p l e  and o f t e n  a l s c  
i n  p r a c t i c e ,  s o l v e  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
f o r  U, i n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  t h e  u t i l i t y  i m p l i c i t l y  a t t a c h e d  t o  L i f e ,  t o  h e a l t h ,  o r  t o  
wha teve r  o t h e r  v a l u e  tl ie s t a n d a r d  i s  supposed t o  p r o t e c t .  
' ~ l ~ i s  p a r t  oE t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  r e l i e s  h e a v i l y  on s e c t i o n s  of  my p a p e r  "The 
F e a s i b i l i t y  of  S o c i a l  P o l i c i e s , "  P o l i c y  S c i e n c e s ,  Eor thcoming.  
9 ~ d c r l d  H e a l t h  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  op .  c i t . ,  p .  11 
Such calculations have been performed, For instailce, in the field of traffic 
safety,10 and there is no reason why they cannot be replicated in the health 
and environmental sectors. Making these valuations explicit can produce conse- 
quences of practical significance: a) the decision maker becomes aware of the 
opportunity costs of setting standards at different levels; and b) it helps 
to bring the problem of the mutual consistency of different standards--both at the 
national and at the international level--at least one step closer to a rational 
solution. 
With the proliferation of standards and administrative rules of a similar 
character, the question of consistency is becoming important and deserves much 
more attention and systematic investigation than it has received so far. In any 
given country, one can find enormous variations in the implicit valuations of life 
and health Lhat are embedded in official and semi-official standards, both over 
time and across different fields of activity. For instance, in the United States 
during the Second World War the officers responsible for setting design standards 
insisted upon heavy armor for bombers, which in turn required larger aircraft. 
Subsequent analysis revealed that the requirements implied values of several 
million dollars per life saved. By contrast, in the late sixties, military air- 
craft were designed almost without any regard to vulnerability, with an implicit 
value for human life fairly close to zero. Similar variability has been found in 
the implications of US Federal Aviation Agency regulations for airline safety, in 
safety features of highway design, and in public health programs.11 
Internationally, the discrepancies are even more striking. A good example 
here are the standards for maxium concentrations of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) 
in industrial plants. The first restrictions--500 parts per million (pprn) in the 
US and UK--were imposed not because of VCM's toxicity, but rather because of its 
inflammability. After strong indications began accumulating that VCM may be 
carcinogenic, and the discovery of a causal link with acro-osteolysis (an 
apparently reversible disease affecting the skin and bones of toes and fingers), 
the upper limit was set at 200 ppm in the UK, while the value of 500 ppm remained 
in force in the United States. In Germany, on the other hand, a maximum workplace 
concentration of 100 ppm was established on the basis of research carried out at 
Dow Chemical Co. On the very same scientific evidence, Dow itself set its standard 
at 50 ppm, as early as 1961.12 
'O~ood examples can be found in H. Levy-Lambert and H. Guillai~me, La Rational isation 
des Choix Budgetaires, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971, especi- 
ally chapters 5 and 7. Also see M. Jones-'ee, "Valuation of Reduction in 
Probability of Death by Road Accident," Jour~inl of Trausl~i>rfition Economics and 
Policy, Vol. 3, 1969, pp. 37-47. 
llCf. Martin J .  Bailey's comments on T.C. Schelling's "Tire Life You Save May Be 
Your Own," Public Expenditure Analysis, S.B. Cl~ase J r .  ed. Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1968. ,\lbo, i:. J .  Hitch and K.X. McKearl, The Economics of 
Defense in the Nuclear Age, op. cit. 11. 196; H. A. Thomas, Jr., "The Animal Farm: 
A Mathematical Model for the Discussion of Social Standards for Control of the 
Environment," The Quarterly Journ~~l ~ . .  rc~,nomics, Fehruary 1973. 
1L 
L. WcGinty, "Science Paused and 17 Died," Ncw Scientist, 13 June 1974, pp. 
675-676. (I owe this reierence to the kindness of Mrs. Gillian Kelley of IIASA.) 
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4. SOME GENERAL.IZATIONS 
The cost-benefit approach to standard setting represents a significant 
improvement over current practices. It is not, however, the most general approach 
to problems of this kind, as has been sometimes asserted.13 
Generalizations can be pursued along different lines. I shall mention here 
the two extensions of the basic cost-benefit framework that appear most interesting 
to me, even though the practicality of the first proposal is open to serious doubts, 
given our present level of knowledge. 
The technique of cost-benefit analysis is always applied in the context of 
a partial equilibrium model. The calculations of the costs and benefits of the 
consequences of a particular alternative are performed under the assumption that 
the wider economic and institutional environment remains essentially unaffected by 
the decision. This assumption is often quite unrealistic. One could, therefore, 
try to extend the cost-benefit approach to standard setting, by operating with a 
general equilibrium model which include; also an environmental and health sector. 
A.V. Kneese and R.C. dlArge have, in fact, attempted to examine the problem of 
environmental standards in the setting of a general equilibrium model. They have 
been able to derive explicit environmental standards via taxes on final products 
in such a way that, in principle, the externalities due to environmental pollution 
could be eliminated, while assuring that the Pareto optimum conditions are met 
everywhere in the economy. l4 
The analysis is based on the assumption OF competition, with consequent 
satisfaction of the Pareto conditions (prices equal to marginal social costs) 
throughout the economy, except for environmental services. While it would be possi- 
ble, at least in principle, to extend the model by adding the health services, it 
must be admitted that we do not know enough about the nature of the production 
functions and of demand-supply relationships holding in the health sector, to make 
the approach feasible at present. Moreover, the model would not be applicable in 
countries where the provision of hedlth services has been wholly or partially 
divorced from the working of the price mechanism and where, as a consequence, the 
Paretian value judgment has been, in fact, rejected. Thus, even if the numerous 
efforts now under way to develop econometric models of the health system, were to 
produce practically relevant results in the near future this would not be of much 
assistance for the kind of generalizations I have been discussing. 
A different, and pragmatically more significant, generalization can be 
achieved by viewing the process o f  standard setting as a particular type of decision 
making under uncertainty. As a matter of fact, many environmental standards are 
expressed in what are essentially probabilistic terms. Air and water quality 
standards prescribe maximum permitted values for long-term mean concentrations, 
together with provisions to the effect that the average concentrations over shorter 
periods must not exceed given levels with more than a certain frequency. For in- 
stance, the primary air quality standards for the protection of public health set 
by the US Environmental Protection Agency on April 30, 1971, put the upper bounds 
for sulfur oxides at 80 mg/m3 = 0.03 ppm for the annual arithmetic mean, and at 
365 mg/m3 = 0.14 ppm for the maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded more 
than once per year. 
13see, for instance, A.J. Culyer, R.J. Lavers, and A. Williams, op, cit. 
14~.v. Kneese and R.C. d1Arge, "Pervasive External Costs and the Response of society," 
in the Analysis and  valuation of Public Expenditures: the PPB System, Washington 
D.C.: US Government Printlng Office, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 87-115. Also, A. Myrick 
Freeman 111, R.H. Haveman, A.V. Kneese, 'l'lie tconomics of Environmental Policy, New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 
Water standards have to be met under the average minimum flow for a consecutive 
period of time (usually one week) to be expected once in every ten years, etc. 
Moreover, in the case of certain air pollutants--e.g. carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons, nitric oxide, nitrogen dioxide, nitrogen oxides, oxidant, and s~ilfur 
dioxide--statistical distributions of average, median, and maximum measurrd con- 
centrations have been calculated.15 These estimates allow one to calculate how 
often the concentrations will exceed given levels, and hence to assess the risk 
that the concentration temporarily rises to dangerously high levels. 
There are many ways of structuring the uncertainty surrounding the process 
of standard setting. The examples just given suggest a formulation of the problem 
in terms of a chance-constrained programming model.16 
Let x,,x,,. ..,x be decision variables that can be manipulated 
to attain specified levels of quality standards s1,s2,...,s . 
m 
In a case of water pollution control, for example, the standards 
may express (perhaps in an aggregate way) different characteristics 
of water quality, such as dissolved oxygen concentration, coliform 
bacteria density, taste and odor, temperature, radioactivity, and 
so on. Denote by a,. the effectiveness of x. with respect to s.. 
11 1 I 
If the required levels of the s. are stochastically determined-- 
I 
e.g. because of stochastic variations in stream flows, waste flows, 
weather conditions--one possible version of the standard-setting 
problem is the following: 
n 
minimize w = C C.X. , 
i=l 
subject to 
n 
Pr (Z a..x. > s.) > IT. 
i=l 1 J  1 - J - J ' 
xi 0 i = 1 , .  n; 0 < n . < L ,  j = 1 ,... m , 
- 1- 
1 5 ~ o r  more details, see s.!. Gustafson and K.O. Kortanek, "Mathematical Models for 
Air Pollution Control: Determination of Optimum Abatement Policies," in Models for 
Environmental Pollution Control, R.A. Deininger ed. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor 
Science Publishers, Inc., 1973, ch. 13. 
16To the best of my knowledge, no application of chance-constrained programming 
methods to standard setting has appeared in the literature, although R.A. Deininger 
has apparently discussed the relevance of this model in an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation. Deterministic optimization models for standard setting have, however, , 
been considered; see, for instance, the review paper by W.O. Spofford, Jr., 
"TotalEnvironmental Quality Management Models," in Models for Environmental 
Pollution Contro1,op. cit., ch. 19 and the Gustafson-Kortanek paper mentioned in 
the preceding note. 
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where Pr stands for probability and c. is tile unit cast associated 
with decision variable x1 .I7 Using alcero order decision rule (all 
the x. values are assigned ab initio), the problem can be immediately 
reformulated in a deterministic equivalent version. Let F ,  be the 
J 
distribution function of the population from which the values of 
-1 
s. are sampled. Then F. ( T I j )  is the n.-fractile of s.--i.e. Pr 
J 
- 1 J J (s. < F .  ( 11 . ) )  = n.--and we get the equivalent linear programing 
J -  J J J 
problem: 
n 
minimize w = C C.W. , 
i=l 
subject to 
The dual version of the problem is particularly significant for the 
logic of standard setting: 
m 
-1 
maximize z = 1 F. ( n . 1 ~ .  
j=l J J J '  
subject to 
m 
1 aijyj 5 ci, i = 1,. . . ,n 
j=1 
The optimal y. values represent the evaluations imputed to the risk indicator 
or ![j or, rather to Ihe corresponding fractile. Like the w value for the objec- 
tive function in the primal problem the z value in the dual is expressed in 
monetary terms (if the costs are so calculated). 
171n the water pollution control example, x. could be the amount of waste removed 
per day in pounds of BOD; c. would then be $he cost of removal of x.. In fact, two 
more suffixes should be attiched to the variables and coefficients A£ the model to 
indicate the source of pollution and the point at which the measurement is made; 
the a.. would represent "transfer coefficients." Given the purely suggestive nature 
of thhJpresent discussion, complete rigor seems out of place. For the same reason, 
I do not enter into details concerning such practically important issues as the 
scaling of the quality standards. 
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But while the c. refer to treatment costs (or to the cost of whatever actions are 
needed to attai: a given quality standard), the F.-I (11.) rrier to the fractiles 
needed to ensure satisfaction of the correspondin& quality standard with the 
preassigned probability TI. .I8 
1 
The chance-constrained ~rogramming model is, of course, linear. The linearity' 
assumptions hold, for instance, for constraints based on models for dissolved 
oxygen of the Streeter-Phelps type, but certainly not in many other situations. 
When serious non-linearities are present, it nay be preferable to incorporate the 
quality standard constraints in the objective function via a penalty function 
approach.19 
5. ALTERNATIVES TO STANDARD SETTING 
A qualitatively different type of generalization is introduced in the 
discussion by asking whether standards are really needed, or are the best way, to 
achieve a given policy goal. The possibility of regulating essential aspects of 
social life by administrative rules appeals strongly to the rationalistic bias of 
the social planner. To him, standards and norms are, in the words of a recent 
United Nations publication, "an element of quantitative precision in the determin- 
ation of the goals and means of social policy."20 However, serious doubts have 
been raised concerning the possibility of coping, by means of standards and 
administrative regulations with the technological and organizational complexities 
of today's health systems.21 
The conceptual difficulties and ambiguities inhe~ent in the use of standards 
as indicators of needs have already been discussed in the first part of this paper. 
As rules of action or policy constraints, standards and norms tend to replace 
policy objectives in the minds of health planners. There are also serious problems 
connected with the inflexibility of standards (their formal codification introduces 
essential discontinuities in the decision process), their excessive uniformity, 
and the frequent uncertainties about the legal and administrative means of enforce- 
ment'' with a corresponding uncertain~y about implementation costs. 
The effectiveness of standards as tools of control can also be questioned. 
Because of socioeconomic growth and technical innovations, standards quickly become 
obsolete, and thus useless as a device to measure the discrepancy between goals and 
achievements. If, on the other hand, they are revised frequently, they lose one 
of their main advantages, namely that of providing the health planner and the 
administrator with fixed reference points and benchmarks. 
'The close connection between chance-constrained programing and cost-effective- 
ness has been pointed out by A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, and G.L. Thompson, "Chance- 
Constrained Programming and Related Approaches to Cost Effectiveness," Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Institute of Technology, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, 
Management Sciences Research Report No. 39, April 16, 1965. 
1 9 ~ s  suggested, for instance, by W.O. Spofford, Jr., op. cit. 
''united Nations European Program for Social Development, Rapport du Groupe 
dVExperts sur les Methodes Utilisges pour la Dgtermination des Normes dans la 
Planification des Secteurs Sociaux, New York: SOA/ESPD/l, 1972, p. 14. 
"H.L. Blum and Associates, Notes on Comprehensive Planning for Health, Berkeley: 
School of Public Helath, U. of Calif. 1968, p. 433. 
"see, for instance, E.J. Cleary, The Orsanco Story, Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1967, especially pp. 56-59. 
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When the standard applies to a variety of more or less autonomous agents, 
the problem of control merges into that of devising suitable incentives, so that 
the agents will be motivated to adopt types 01 behavior that art compatible with 
overall policy objectives. Many standards have built into them features that make 
their implementation particularly costly, in monetary and/or psychological terms, 
for the target group whose behavior they attempt to modify. Safety standards 
provide many examples of built-in disincentives. Industrial safety standards often 
make the accomplishment of certain tasks so difficult or disagreeable that the 
operatives have strong incentives to disregard them. 
A law requiring every car owner to install expensive safety devices 
essentially levies a tax to promote the purchase of certain types of safety equip- 
ment. Some car owners may have preferred to economize on these devices, perhaps 
using the savings to purchase a new--and safer--automobile more frequently than 
would be possible if everybody is forced to invest heavily in safety device~.~3 
Similarily, it can be shown that some building standards may actually lower the 
overall quality of the housing accessible to lower income groups. Again, consider 
the requirement that all cars be equipped with devices to reduce the level of 
pollutants escaping from the engine. If the devices shorten the life of the engine 
and require frequent repairs, car owners have incentives to make the devices 
ineffective . 
The point I wish to make is that standards are not ends in themselves, but 
only one of many tools that can be used to accomplish particular policy objectives. 
The spectrum of possibilities ranges from outright prohihition of certain types of 
activities or behaviors that are considered particularly harmful in individual or 
social terms, to the provision of a system of penalties and rewards that essential- 
ly leaves the final choice to the responsibility, and self-interest, of each 
decision maker.24 Standards, administrative regulations, and direct public action 
should be viewed as discrete, intermediate stages along an essentially continuous 
spectrum. 
Each of these alternatives presents advantages and disadvantages that should 
be carefully assessed hefore deciding in favor of a particular solution. In fields 
as complex as health and environmental control, important policy objectives can 
probably be achieved only by a mixture of approaches. While the weights to be 
attached to each element in the combination will probably depend, to a large extent, 
on the institutional framework in which the decisions are taken, it does not seem 
wise for any decision maker to rely only on the more direct forms of regulation. 
I have restricted my critical remarks to the problem of standard setting 
because too much faith is put, especially by health planners, in this particular 
policy tool. Only by dispelling the mystique that surrounds the standard setting 
process can we rationally evaluate its benefits and costs, both internally and with 
respect to alternative approaches. The question of the mutual consistency of 
different standards; the reasons for the significant international differences in 
standard setting that persist, even when there is a substantial agreement on the 
scientific data base; the design of flexible standards for systems subject to 
large stochastic variations; the assessment of policing costs, and of the 
2 3 ~ .  Demsetz, "Contracting Cost and public Policy," in The Analysis and Evaluation 
of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, op. cit.,vol, pp. 169-170. Val. 1, 
24~or a good discussion of the role of incentives at every stage of policy making, 
see C.L. Schultze, "The Role of Incentives, Penalties and Rewards in Attaining 
Effective Policy," in the Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB 
System, op. cit. 
L 3 d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  and e f f i c i e n c y  consequences  of s t a n d a r d s ;  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
t h e  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s :  t h e s e  a r e  o n l y  s i~me  of t l ie many i n t e r e s t i n g  pr<lblcms 
t h a t  have  y e t  t o  be s y s t ~ m a t i c a l l y  e x p l o r e d .  However, a  n e c e s s a r y  p r e r e q u i s i t e  t o  
any mean ing fu l  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h e  c l e a r  realization t h a t  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  n e i t h e r  a r b i -  
t r a r i l y  s e t ,  no r  u n i q u e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by s c i e n t i f i c  and t e c l l n i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
They r e p r e s e n t ,  r a t h e r ,  soc ioeconomic  d e c i s i o n s  whosc f a r - r e a c h i n g  consequences  we 
a r e  o n l y  now b e g i n n i n g  t o  a p p r e c i a t e .  
2 5 ~ o r  example ,  i t  h a s  been a rgued  t h a t  t h e  e m i s s i o n  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  c o a l  b u r n i n g  
power p l a n t s  s e t  by t h e  US Env i ronmen ta l  P r o t e c t i o n  Agency i n  1971 ,  may c a u s e  a  
m a s s i v e  s h i f t  t o  l ow-su l fu r  c o a l  i n  t h e  v e r y  n e a r  f u t u r e .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
u t i l i t i e s  may s h i f t  t o  l o w - s u l f u r  o i l  and n a t u r a l  g a s  i n  o r d e r  t o  meet t h e  s t a n d a r d s ;  
c f .  C.R. A l e t a ,  "A C r i t i q u e  of t h e  New EPA E m i s s i n n  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  New S t a t i o n a r y  
S o u r c e s , "  I t h a c a ,  New York: C o r n e l l  Energy P r o j e c t ,  P a p e r  no.  71-11, Oc tobe r  1971.  
, 
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a s w i t c h  t o  l ow-su l fu r  f u e l s  would compound t h e  a l r e a d y  s e r i o u s  
p rob l em of s u p p l y  of  t h e s e  f u e l  s o u r c e s ,  b u t  t h e  f u l l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  develclp- 
men t s ,  i n  t e rms  of  economic e f f i c i e n c y  and even  of  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  r ema in  
t o  be  worked o u t .  
Remarks of t h e  D i  s : u s s .~n t ,  Mr. Gros 
Mr. b l a j c~ne ' s  puper suggested t o  Plr. Cros  ;I number of p r o b l c n ~ s  i n  t h e  s e t -  
t i n g  of s t 2 n J a r i ; s :  
i )  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  c a t e r i n g  t o  u n c . e r t a i n t i c s .  The u s u a I  phenomenon we 
o b s e r v f  i u  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  a s  Cur thc r  in for ma ti or^ d i s p e l s  u n c e r t a i n t y  
i s  a  t i g h t e n i n g  of s t a n d a r d s .  Assuming t h a t  mean csstirnati-d haza rd  r e -  
mains cc lns t an t ,  one would c s p r c t  morc s t r i n g e n t  s t a n d a r d s  e a r l i e r  when 
t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  h i g h e r ;  
1) tile c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  Lirnong a g c n c i e s  t h a t  o f t e n  have s i g n i f i c a n t  i m -  
p a c t  upon t h e  s t a n d a r d s  d e r i v e d ;  
3)  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  S t a r r  t h a t  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  of r i s k s  i s  v a r i a b l e .  
Peop le  a r e  more w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  I - i s k s  v o l u n t s r i l y  upon themse lves  than  
they  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  r i s k ?  es l igenously  inlposed. A d v e r t i s i n g  cam- 
p a i g n s  can i n c r e n s c  a c v e p t a n c e  uf r e a s o n a b l e  r i s k s ;  
4)  tire me t t iodo log ica l  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  s e t t i n g  s e p a r a t e  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  p o l l u -  
t a n t s  wlic~sc c h i e f  harm conies t h rough  s y n e r g i s t i c  e f f e c t s ;  and 
5) t h e  d e l i c a t e  q u e s t i o n  of wtiose u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  s h o u l d  be  c o n s u l t e d  
and used f o r  gu idance .  
Comients  upon S t a n d a r d s  
Confe rence  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f f e r e d  a  number of r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  p o i n t s  brought  
fo rward  by t4r. Xajone:  
1 )  t h a t  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  n o t  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  de t e rmined  and ,  p e r h a p s ,  canno t  
b e ;  
2 )  t h a t  t h e  many c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  f o r  a p p r o p r i a t e  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  r e q u i r e  
a  good communications sys t em and t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of sys t ems  a n a l y s i s  
t o  t a i l o r  s t a n d a r d s  t o  s p p c i f i c  env i ronmen t s ;  
3) t h a t  a t t i t u d e s  toward s t a n d a r d s  may r e f l e c t  s o c i o l o g i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  to- 
ward r u l e s  and a u t h o r i t y  g e n e r a l l y ;  
4 )  t h a t  en fo rcemen t  c o s t s  must be c o n s i d e r e d .  The unenfo rced  s t a n d a r d  i s  
no s t a n d a r d ;  
5 )  t h a t  c e r t a i n  phenomena may n o t  be  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  v i a  s t a n -  
d a r d s .  The new US p o l i c y  of r ev i ewing  a l l  t r e a t m e n t s  a p p l i e d  t o  pa- 
t i e n t s  r a i s e s  such  q u e s t i o n s  a s  whether  i t  makes s e n s e  t o  a p p l y  s t a n -  
d a r d s  t o  t o n s i l l e c t o m i e s ;  and 
6 )  t h a t  f l e x i b l e  s t a n d a r d s  have  drawbacks .  One member f e l t  t h a t  t h e  f l e x -  
i b l e  s t a n d a r d  i s  no s t a n d a r d  and t h a t  M r .  Majone had been i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  
m e t i c u l o u s  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h i s  p o i n t .  
Responses  by Mr. Majone 
M r .  Majone ag reed  upon t h e  i m p o r t a n t e o f  en fo rcemen t  and of t a i l o r i n g  s t a n -  
d a r d s  t o  s p e c i f i c  env i ronmen t s .  He p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  the rne thodo log ica l  and p h i l o -  
s o p h i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a s s i g n i n g  u t i l i t y  t o  tt ie hurnan l i f e  h a s  p l agued  t h e  s e t -  
t i n g  of s t a n d a r d s .  M r .  Majone c h a r a c t e r i z e d  s t a r : d a r d s  a s  one i m p o r t a n t  p o l i c y  t o o l  
f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  complex i ty  of t h e  world  and i t s  sys t ems .  The simplicity of 
s t a n d a r d s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  l e v e r s  enhances  t h e i r  u t i l i t y .  
